

# HATS Deliverable D4.1 Appendix: Library of generated protocols

February 24, 2012

In the following we show a sample of protocols generated automatically.

## The Taxpayer exmple

```

module TestProject;

import * from ABSProtocols;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment;

def Bool testmessageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "C" ),
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )),
    Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

def Bool testmessageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "C" ),
    Cons ( TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

class Cclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = False ;

Bool messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentS = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentTP = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedElem ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "C" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

    await( messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery ) ;

    agentS = Agent(AgentVar( "S" )) ;

    agentTP = Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

    textstringTAXIDTP = TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

    messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "C" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

    await( messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery ) ;

    textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

```

```

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP (msg) )
{messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP (msg) )
{messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),

Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ,
Cons ( Text("Request_Get_Taxes"), Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool
testmessageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),

Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ,
Cons ( TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),

Cons ( Text("Validate"),
Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromTPToStextBooleanResult (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),

Cons ( Text("Boolean_Result"), Nil
) ) => True ;

- => False ;

```

```

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
    Cons ( Text("Freeze"),
    Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

class Sclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxesQuery = False ;

Bool messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery = False ;
Bool messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTPQuery = False ;
Bool messageFromTPToStextBooleanResultQuery = False ;
Bool messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTPQuery = False ;

PayloadElement agentTP = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement agentTC = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement agentC = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;
ProtocolClause
    messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement textRequestGetTaxes = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textstringAMOUNTS = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS = UndefinedClause ;
ProtocolClause
    messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP =
        UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement textstringTAXPAYMENTTP = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textCheckTax = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromSToTCtextCheckTax = UndefinedClause ;
ProtocolClause messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement textValidate = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromTPToStextBooleanResult = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement textBooleanResult = UndefinedElem ;

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ProtocolClause messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textFreeze = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedClause ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

agentTP = Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textstringTAXIDTP = TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" )),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

agentTC = Agent(AgentVar( "TC" )) ;

messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" )),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

agentC = Agent(AgentVar( "C" )) ;

messageFromSToCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "C" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "C" )),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes =
Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Text(" Request_Get_Taxes")]) ;

await( messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxesQuery ) ;

textRequestGetTaxes = Text(" Request_Get_Taxes") ;

textstringAMOUNTS = TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" )) ;

messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" )),
list [ TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" )) ]) ) ;

messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP =
Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ,
TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

await( messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery ) ;

textstringTAXPAYMENTTP = TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textCheckTax = Text(" Check_Tax") ;

messageFromSToTCtextCheckTax = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" ),
list [ Text(" Check_Tax")]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" )),
list [ Text(" Check_Tax")]) ) ;

messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "TC" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Validate"), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

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await( messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTPQuery ) ;

textValidate = Text(" Validate" ) ;

messageFromTPToStextBooleanResult = Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Boolean_Result" ) ] ) ;

await( messageFromTPToStextBooleanResultQuery ) ;

textBooleanResult = Text(" Boolean_Result" ) ;

messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP = Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Freeze" ), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" ) ) ] ) ;

await( messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTPQuery ) ;

textFreeze = Text(" Freeze" ) ;

messageFromSToCtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "C" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" ) ) ] ) ;

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "C" ),
list [ TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" ) ) ] ) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive( ProtocolClause msg ){
if ( testmessageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes (msg) )
{ messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxesQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP (msg) )
{ messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTPQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP (msg) )
{ messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTPQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromTPToStextBooleanResult (msg) )
{ messageFromTPToStextBooleanResultQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP (msg) )
{ messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTPQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

```

```

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "TC" ),
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )),
    Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

def Bool testmessageFromSToTCtextCheckTax (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "TC" ),
    Cons ( Text("Check_Tax"), Nil
) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

class TCclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = False ;

Bool messageFromSToTCtextCheckTaxQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentS = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentTP = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToTCtextCheckTax = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textCheckTax = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textValidate = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textFreeze = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

await( messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery ) ;

agentS = Agent(AgentVar( "S" )) ;

agentTP = Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textstringTAXIDTP = TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

messageFromSToTCtextCheckTax = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TC" ),
list [ Text("Check_Tax")]) ;

await( messageFromSToTCtextCheckTaxQuery ) ;

textCheckTax = Text("Check_Tax") ;

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textValidate = Text(" Validate" ) ;

messageFromTCToStextValidatetextstringTAXIDTP = Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Validate"), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Validate"), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

textFreeze = Text(" Freeze" ) ;

messageFromTCToStextFreezetextstringTAXIDTP = Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Freeze"), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "TC" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Freeze"), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP (msg) )
{messageFromSToTCagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromSToTCtextCheckTax (msg) )
{messageFromSToTCtextCheckTaxQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "TP" ),

Cons ( Agent( AgentVar( "TP" ) ),
Cons ( TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "S" ), AgentVar( "TP" ),

Cons ( TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" ) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

class TPclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = False ;

```



```

Bool messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTSQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentS = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentTP = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textstringTAXIDTP = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textRequestGetTaxes = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes = UndefinedClause ;

ProtocolClause messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textstringAMOUNTS = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textstringTAXPAYMENTTP = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textBooleanResult = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromTPToStextBooleanResult = UndefinedClause ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP =
Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" ),
list[ Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )), TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

await( messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery ) ;

agentS = Agent(AgentVar( "S" )) ;

agentTP = Agent(AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textstringTAXIDTP = TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textRequestGetTaxes = Text( "Request_Get_Taxes" ) ;

messageFromTPToStextstringTAXIDTPtextRequestGetTaxes =
Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list[ TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Text( "Request_Get_Taxes" )]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list[ TextOrigin( "TAXID" , AgentVar( "TP" )) , Text( "Request_Get_Taxes" )]) ) ;

messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS = Message(AgentVar( "S" ),AgentVar( "TP" ),
list[ TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" )) ]) ;

await( messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTSQuery ) ;

textstringAMOUNTS = TextOrigin( "AMOUNT" , AgentVar( "S" )) ;

textstringTAXPAYMENTTP = TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

textstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP = TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ;

messageFromTPToStextstringTAXPAYMENTTPtextstringCHARITYPAYMENTTP =
Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list[ TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ,
TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "TP" ),AgentVar( "S" ),
list[ TextOrigin( "TAXPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ,
TextOrigin( "CHARITYPAYMENT" , AgentVar( "TP" )) ]) ) ;

```

```

textBooleanResult = Text(" Boolean_Result" ) ;

messageFromTPToStextBooleanResult = Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Boolean_Result" ) ] ) ;

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "TP" ), AgentVar( "S" ),
list [ Text(" Boolean_Result" ) ] ) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

```

```

Unit receive( ProtocolClause msg ){
if ( testmessageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTP ( msg ) )
{messageFromSToTPagentTPtextstringTAXIDTPQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTS ( msg ) )
{messageFromSToTPtextstringAMOUNTSQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

```

```

// The protocol: TaxPayment Protocol
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent( AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network( zombieAgent ) ;

Agent objectTP ;

objectTP = new cog TPclass ( AgentVar( "TP" ) , network ) ;

network!register( AgentVar( "TP" ), objectTP ) ;

Agent objectTC ;

objectTC = new cog TCclass ( AgentVar( "TC" ) , network ) ;

network!register( AgentVar( "TC" ), objectTC ) ;

Agent objectC ;

objectC = new cog Cclass ( AgentVar( "C" ) , network ) ;

network!register( AgentVar( "C" ), objectC ) ;

Agent objectS ;

objectS = new cog Sclass ( AgentVar( "S" ) , network ) ;

network!register( AgentVar( "S" ), objectS ) ;

}

```

```
// end of file
```

## ISO One pass unilateral

```
module TestProject;

import * from ABSProtocols;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment;

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
  PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement textText1A = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement encryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
    UndefinedClause;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

  textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

  newnonceNAA = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ) ;

  agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

  textText1A = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

  keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

  encryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

  messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
  list[ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ),
  AgentVar( "A" ) ), Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ;

  network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
  list[ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ) ;

  }
  /* End of run-method */

  Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){skip ;

  }
  /* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool
  testmessageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A (ProtocolClause msg)
  = case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),
```

```

    Cons ( TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
    Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ,
    Cons ( TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

```

```

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1AQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
    UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText1A = UndefinedElem ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )] ) ;

await( messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1AQuery ) ;

agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) , list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ;

nonceNAA = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

textText1A = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A (msg) )

```

```

{messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAgentBtextText1AQuery = True ;
  }
  else { skip ;
    }
/* End of test method */
}
/* End of receive method */
}
/* End of class */

```

```

// The protocol: ISO-SYM-One-Pass-unilateral Authentication
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectA ;

objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;

Agent objectB ;

objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;

}

```

## ISO One two-pass unilateral

```

module TestProject;

import * from ABSProtocols;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment;

def Bool testmessageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
    Cons ( TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) , Nil
  ) ) ) => True ;
  - => False ;
} ;

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1BQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceNBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText1B = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText3A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

```

```

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
  messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A = UndefinedClause ;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B =
Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ;

await( messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1BQuery ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

nonceNBB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

textText1B = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

textText3A = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

encryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A =
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B (msg) )
{messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1BQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ,

Cons ( TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ,

```

```

    Cons ( TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

_ => False ;

} ;

```

```

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
  Bool messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2AQuery = False ;

  PayloadElement newnonceNBB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement textText1B = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B = UndefinedClause ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A =
    UndefinedClause ;

  PayloadElement textText3A = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    newnonceNBB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

    textText1B = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    messageFromBToAnonceNBBtextText1B = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ) ;

    network!send( Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ) ) ;

    messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A =
      Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ) ;

    await( messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2AQuery ) ;

    textText3A = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

    decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) , list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ) ;

    agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

  }

```

```

/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2A (msg) )
{messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentBtextText2AQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
/* End of test method */
}
/* End of receive method */
}
/* End of class */

```

```

// The protocol: ISO-SYM-Two-Pass-unilateral Authentication
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectA ;

objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;

Agent objectB ;

objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;

}
// end of file

```

## ISO One two-pass mutual

```

module TestProject;

import * from ABSProtocols;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment;

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newnonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText1A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textText4A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceNBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

```



```

PayloadElement textText3B = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
  UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
  messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
    UndefinedClause ;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

  textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

newnonceNAA = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

textText1A = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

  encryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

  messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ;

  network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ;

  textText4A = TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

  nonceNBB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

  agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

  textText3B = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

  encryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ) ;

  messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ] )]) ;

  network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ] )]) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){skip ;

```

```

    }
    /* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool
  testmessageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAgentBtextText1A
    (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),

  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" ))),
  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool
  testmessageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B
    (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),

  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ,
  Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "A" ))),
  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool
  messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAgentBtextText1AQuery = False ;

Bool
  messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3BQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause
  messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAgentBtextText1A =
    UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
  decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNAAgentBtextText1A =
    UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText1A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause

```

```

    messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
        UndefinedClause    ;

    PayloadElement textText4A = UndefinedElem    ;

    PayloadElement decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B
        = UndefinedElem    ;

    PayloadElement newnonceNBB = UndefinedElem    ;

    PayloadElement textText3B = UndefinedElem    ;

    Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

        messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
        Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
        list [ TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
        Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" )) ,
        Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ;

        await( messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1AQuery ) ;

        agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

        textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

        keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

        decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A =
        Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) , list [
        Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" )) ,
        Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ;

        nonceNAA = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" )) ;

        agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

        textText1A = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

        messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
        Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
        list [ TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
        Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) , TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ] )]) ;

        await( messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3BQuery ) ;

        textText4A = TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

        decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B =
        Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) , list [
        Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ,
        Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) , TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ] ) ;

        newnonceNBB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ) ;

        textText3B = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    }
    /* End of run-method */

    Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
    if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1A (msg) )
    {messageFromAToBtextText2AencryptKeyABnonceNAAagentBtextText1AQuery = True ;

    }
    else {

```

```

if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3B (msg) )
{messageFromAToBtextText4AencryptKeyABnonceNBBagentAtextText3BQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

// The protocol: ISO-SYM-Two-Pass mutual Authentication
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectA ;

objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;

Agent objectB ;

objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;

}
// end of file

```

## ISO-SYM-threepass-mutual.abs

```

module TestProject ;

import * from ABSProtocols ;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment ;

def Bool testmessageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
    Cons ( TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1BQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

```

```

PayloadElement textText1B = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textText3A = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement newnonceRAA = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement encryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
    UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textText5A = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement textText4A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
    encryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A =
    UndefinedClause ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ;

    await( messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1BQuery ) ;

    agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    nonceRBB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

    textText1B = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    textText3A = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    newnonceRAA = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ) ;

    textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

    encryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
    list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ),
        AgentVar( "B" ) ), Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

    messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
        Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ;

    network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
        Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ;

    textText5A = TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

```

```

textText4A = TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

encryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A =
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ;

messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
    list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
      Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list[ TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
    list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
      Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B (msg) )
{messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1BQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool
testmessageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ,

  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ,
  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool
testmessageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ,

  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ,
  Cons ( TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

```

```

- => False ;
} ;

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2AQuery = False ;

Bool messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4AQuery = False ;

PayloadElement newnonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText1B = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B = UndefinedClause ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textText3A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceRAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText2A = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textText5A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textText4A = UndefinedElem ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

newnonceRBB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

textText1B = TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

messageFromBToAnonceRBBtextText1B = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("Text1", AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ) ;

messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) , TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]) ;

await( messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2AQuery ) ;

textText3A = TextOrigin("Text3", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

```

```

decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )), list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" )),
  Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ;

nonceRAA = Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

textText2A = TextOrigin("Text2", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A =
Message( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" )),
Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ] )]] ;

await( messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4AQuery ) ;

textText5A = TextOrigin("Text5", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

decryptKeyABencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )), list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )),
  list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" )),
  Agent(AgentVar( "A" )), TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ] ) ;

textText4A = TextOrigin("Text4", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2A (msg) )
{messageFromAToBtextText3AencryptKeyABnonceRAAnonceRBBagentBtextText2AQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4A (msg) )
{messageFromAToBtextText5AencryptKeyABnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAtextText4AQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

```

```

// The protocol: ISO-SYM-Two-Pass-unilateral Authentication
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectA ;

```



```

objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;
Agent objectB ;
objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;
}
// end of file

```

## Andrew Secure

```

def Bool testmessageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "Y" ) , AgentVar( "X" ) ,
    Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ) ,AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ,
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ) , AgentVar( "X" ) ) ,
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ) , AgentVar( "Y" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

```

```

def Bool testmessageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "Y" ) , AgentVar( "X" ) ,
    Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ) ,AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ,
    Cons ( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ) ,AgentVar( "Y" ) ,KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ) ,
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY2" ) , AgentVar( "Y" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

```

```

class Xclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYYQuery = False ;
Bool messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2YQuery = False ;
PayloadElement agentX = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement newnonceNXX = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement keyKeyXY = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement encryptKeyXYnonceNXX = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement agentY = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX = UndefinedClause ;
ProtocolClause messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement nonceincrementNXX = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement nonceNYY = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement nonceincrementNYY = UndefinedElem ;

```

```

PayloadElement encryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY = UndefinedElem ;
ProtocolClause messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY = UndefinedClause ;
ProtocolClause messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y = UndefinedClause ;
PayloadElement decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement newkeyKeyXYKV = UndefinedElem ;
PayloadElement nonceNY2Y = UndefinedElem ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

agentX = Agent(AgentVar( "X" )) ;

newnonceNXX = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" ) ) ) ;

keyKeyXY = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ))) ;

encryptKeyXYnonceNXX =
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" ) )] ) ;

agentY = Agent(AgentVar( "Y" )) ;

messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX = Message(AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "X" )),
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" ) )] )]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "X" )),
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" ) )] )]) ) ) ;

messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY =
Message(AgentVar( "Y" ),AgentVar( "X" ),
list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) )] )]) ;

await( messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYYQuery ) ;

decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )), list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) )] )] ) ;

nonceincrementNXX = Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" ) ) ;

nonceNYY = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ;

nonceincrementNYY = Nonce( NonceVar (NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ;

encryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY =
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) )] ) ;

messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY =
Message(AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ),
list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) )] )]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ),
list [
Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) )] )]) ) ) ;

```

```

messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y =
  Message( AgentVar( "Y" ), AgentVar( "X" ),
list [
  Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ;

await( messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2YQuery ) ;

decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y =
  Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ), list [
  Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ;

newkeyKeyXYKV =
New( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ) ) ;

nonceNY2Y = Nonce( NonceVar( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive( ProtocolClause msg ){
if ( testmessageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY ( msg ) )
{ messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYYQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y ( msg ) )
{ messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2YQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX ( ProtocolClause msg )
= case msg { Message( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ),

  Cons ( Agent( AgentVar( "X" ) ),
  Cons ( Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" ) ), Nil
) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY ( ProtocolClause msg )
= case msg { Message( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ),

  Cons ( Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar( NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ), Nil
) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

```

```
} ;
```

```
class Yclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
  Bool messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXXQuery = False ;

  Bool messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYYQuery = False ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX = UndefinedClause ;

  PayloadElement agentX = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement keyKeyXY = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceNXX = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement nonceNXX = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement nonceincrementNXX = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceNYY = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement encryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY = UndefinedClause ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY = UndefinedClause ;

  PayloadElement decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement nonceincrementNYY = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newkeyKeyXYKV = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newkeyKeyXYKV = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceNY2Y = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement encryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y = UndefinedClause ;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

  messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX = Message(AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ),
  list [ Agent(AgentVar( "X" )),
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
  list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" )) ] )]) ;

  await( messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXXQuery ) ;

  agentX = Agent(AgentVar( "X" )) ;

  keyKeyXY = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" ))) ;

  decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceNXX =
  Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )), list [
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
  list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" )) ] ) ] ) ;

  nonceNXX = Nonce( NonceVar ( "NX" ), AgentVar( "X" )) ;

  nonceincrementNXX = Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" )) ;

  newnonceNYY = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" )) ) ;

  encryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY =
  Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ),AgentVar( "Y" )),
  list [ Nonce( NonceVar (NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" )) ],
```

```

    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ] ) ) ;

    messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNXXnonceNYY
    = Message( AgentVar( "Y" ), AgentVar( "X" ),
    list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

    network! send( Message( AgentVar( "Y" ), AgentVar( "X" ),
    list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( NX + 1 ), AgentVar( "X" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

    messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY =
    Message( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ),
    list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

    await( messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYYQuery ) ;

    decryptKeyXYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY =
    Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ), list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

    nonceincrementNYY = Nonce( NonceVar ( NY + 1 ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ;

    newkeyKeyXYKV =
    New( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ) ) ;

    newkeyKeyXYKV =
    New( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ) ) ;

    newnonceNY2Y = New( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ) ;

    encryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y =
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ;

    messageFromYToXencryptKeyXYkeyKeyXYKVnonceNY2Y =
    Message( AgentVar( "Y" ), AgentVar( "X" ),
    list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

    network! send( Message( AgentVar( "Y" ), AgentVar( "X" ),
    list [
    Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ),
    list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "X" ), AgentVar( "Y" ), KeyVar( "KV" ) ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "NY2" ), AgentVar( "Y" ) ) ] ] ) ] ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive( ProtocolClause msg ){
if ( testmessageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXX ( msg )
{ messageFromXToYagentXencryptKeyXYnonceNXXQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYY ( msg )
{ messageFromXToYencryptKeyXYnonceincrementNYYQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

```

```

    }
    /* End of test method */

    }
    /* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

// The protocol: Andrew Secure
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectX ;

objectX = new cog Xclass (AgentVar( "X" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "X" ), objectX) ;

Agent objectY ;

objectY = new cog Yclass (AgentVar( "Y" ) , network) ;

network!register(AgentVar( "Y" ), objectY) ;

}
// end of file

```

## Non reversible functions

```

def Bool testmessageFromBToAgentBnonceRBB (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" )),
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

def Bool
testmessageFromBToAgentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABhashnonceNAA (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "B" )),
    Cons ( Encrypt(KeyComposite (
    Cons ( TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ,
    Cons ( Hash(
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nil
) ) , Nil
) ) , Nil
) ) ) => True ;
- => False ;
} ;

```

```

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
  Bool messageFromBToAagentBnonceRBBQuery = False ;

  Bool messageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAAQuery = False ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromBToAagentBnonceRBB = UndefinedClause ;

  PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement nonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement textsymmetric key ABA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement textsymmetrickeyABA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement keyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement hashnonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceRAA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement
    encryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
    = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
    = UndefinedClause ;

  ProtocolClause
messageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA
    = UndefinedClause ;

  PayloadElement
decryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA
    = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement hashnonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

  Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromBToAagentBnonceRBB = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ))]) ;

await( messageFromBToAagentBnonceRBBQuery ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

nonceRBB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ;

textsymmetric key ABA = New( TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB",AgentVar( "A" )) ) ;

textsymmetrickeyABA = TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA =
  Key( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

hashnonceRBB =
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" )) ] ) ;

newnonceRAA = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" )) ) ;

keyKeyAB = Key(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))) ;

```

```

    encryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA =
    Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Key( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ] ) ;

    messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
= Message( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B"  ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Key( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

    network!send( Message( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B"  ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" )), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Key( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ;

    messageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA
= Message( AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A"  ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
    Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ;

    await( messageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAAQuery ) ;

    decryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA =
    Decrypt( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ), list [
    Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ;

    hashnonceNAA =
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromBToAagentBnonceRBB (msg) )
{messageFromBToAagentBnonceRBBQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA (msg) )
{messageFromBToAagentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAAQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool
testmessageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
(ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),

    Cons ( Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),

```



```

    Cons ( Encrypt(KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ))),
    Cons ( Hash(
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nil
) ) ),
    Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "A" ))),
    Cons ( Key( KeyComposite(list [ TextOrigin("symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ), Nil
) ) ) ), Nil
) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

```

```

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool
messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAQuery
= False ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newnonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAgentBnonceRBB = UndefinedClause ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
= UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement keyKeyAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
decryptKeyABencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement hashnonceRBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceRAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textsymmetrickeyABA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement hashnonceNAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA
= UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromBToAgentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAhashnonceNAA
= UndefinedClause ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar( "B" )) ;

newnonceRBB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

messageFromBToAgentBnonceRBB = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )]) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Agent(AgentVar( "B" )), Nonce( NonceVar ( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )]) ) ;

```

```

messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA
= Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

await(
messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAA-
agentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAQuery ) ;

keyKeyAB = Key( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

decryptKeyABencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA =
Decrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), list [
Encrypt( KeySymmetric( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

hashnonceRBB =
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "RB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ;

nonceRAA = Nonce( NonceVar( "RA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

keyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA =
Key( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ;

textsymmetrickeyABA = TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

nonceNAA = Nonce( NonceVar( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

hashnonceNAA =
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ;

encryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABhashnonceNAA =
Encrypt( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) , list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

messageFromBToAgentBencryptKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABhashnonceNAA
= Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Encrypt( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) , list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ;

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Encrypt( KeyComposite( list [ TextOrigin( "symmetric_key_AB", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) , list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "NA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive( ProtocolClause msg ){
if
( testmessageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBB-
nonceRAAagentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABA ( msg ) )
{ messageFromAToBagentAencryptKeyABhashnonceRBBnonceRAA-
agentAkeyKeyCompositetextsymmetrickeyABAQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */
}
/* End of receive method */

```

```

}
/* End of class */

// The protocol: ISO-SYM Two-Pass non-reversible-functions
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;
network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

Agent objectA ;
objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;

Agent objectB ;
objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;

}
// end of file

```

## Internet Key Exchange version 2 with mac

Note that some of the names are manipulated afterwards in order to make it readable - the strings are significantly longer than can be presented nicely

```

module TestProject;

import * from ABSProtocols;
import * from ExecutionEnvironment;

def Bool
  testmessageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),

  Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool testmessageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB
-textCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPS
-KtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB
(ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),

  Cons ( Encrypt( KeyComposite (
  Cons ( Hash(
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Key( KeyComposite( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ,
  Cons ( Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Hash(
  Cons ( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ,
  Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
  Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) ) ) ,
  Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

class Aclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
  Bool messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEBQuery = False ;

  Bool
  messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
  IKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOffer-
  IKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSABQuery = False ;

  PayloadElement textCryptoOfferIKESAA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceKEYAA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement newnonceANONCEA = UndefinedElem ;

  PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

  ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA
= UndefinedClause ;

```

```

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB
= UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferIKESAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceKEYBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceBNONCEB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newkeyKeyABPSK = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
hashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
keyKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEB-
textCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhash-
keyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEB-
textCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB-
agentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnnonce-
BNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedClause ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentB-
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtext-
CryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement decryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtext-
CryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBencryptKeyCompositem-
hashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositem-
nonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonce-
ANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedElem ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

textCryptoOfferIKESAA = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar("A" )) ;

newnonceKEYAA = New(Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar("A" ) ) ) ;

newnonceANONCEA = New(Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar("A" ) ) ) ;

agentB = Agent(AgentVar("B" )) ;

messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA =
Message(AgentVar("A" ), AgentVar("B" ),
list[ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar("A" )) ,
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar("A" ) ) ,
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar("A" ) )]) ;

```

```

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),
list[ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ))] ) ) ;

messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB =
Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
list[ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ,
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ;

await( messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEBQuery ) ;

textCryptoOfferIKESAB = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

nonceKEYBB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

nonceBNONCEB = Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

agentA = Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

newkeyKeyABPSK = New( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ),
AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ) ;

hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEB =
Hash( list[ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ) ;

textCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB =
Key( KeyComposite( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ) ;

hashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB =
Hash( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Key( KeyComposite( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ) ] ) ) ;

keyKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB
= Key( KeyComposite( list[
Hash( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Key( KeyComposite( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ) ] ) ] ) ) ) ;

encryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKey-
CompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonce-
ANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA =
Encrypt( KeyComposite( list[
Hash( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Key( KeyComposite( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ) ] ) , list[ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Hash( list[ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ))] ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ] ) ) ;

messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA =
Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ,
list[
Encrypt( KeyComposite( list[
Hash( list[ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),

```

```

TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ), list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

```

```

network!send( Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),
list [
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ) ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

```

```

messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOffer-
IKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB =
Message( AgentVar( "B" ), AgentVar( "A" ),
list [
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ) ), list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

```

```

await( messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonce-
KEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSABQuery ) ;

```

```

decryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAkeyKeyComposite-
nonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOffer-
IKESAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAB-
nonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB =
Decrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ) ), list [
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ) ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

```

```

hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB =
Hash( list [
Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ;

```

```

textCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB (msg) )
{messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEBQuery = True ;

}
else {
if (
testmessageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAB-
nonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB (msg) )
{messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB-
textCryptoOfferIKESAAkey
KeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAB-
nonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSABQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

def Bool testmessageFromAtoBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),

Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) => True ;

- => False ;

} ;

def Bool
testmessageFromAtoBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAA-
nonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA (ProtocolClause msg)
= case msg {Message( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ),

Cons ( Encrypt(KeyComposite (
Cons ( Hash(
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Cons ( Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )]) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) ,
Cons ( Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Cons ( Hash(
Cons ( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ,
Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
Cons ( Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) , Nil
) ) ) ) ) ) ,

```



```

    Cons ( TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) , Nil
) ) ) ) , Nil
) ) => True ;

_ => False ;

} ;

class Bclass (AgentTerm name, Network network) implements Agent{
Bool messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAQuery = False ;

Bool messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB-
textCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBBagentAhash-
keyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonce-
ANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAAQuery = False ;

ProtocolClause messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA =
UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement agentA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferIKESAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceKEYAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement nonceANONCEA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferIKESAB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newnonceKEYBB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newnonceBNONCEB = UndefinedElem ;

ProtocolClause messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB
= UndefinedClause ;

ProtocolClause messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBB-
agentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedClause ;

PayloadElement keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
hashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
keyKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
decryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkey-
KeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYYBB-
agentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB
= UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement agentB = UndefinedElem ;

PayloadElement newkeyKeyABPSK = UndefinedElem ;

```

```

PayloadElement
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB
    = UndefinedElem    ;

PayloadElement textCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedElem    ;

PayloadElement encryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkey-
KeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonce-
ANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedElem    ;

ProtocolClause
messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAB
nonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = UndefinedClause    ;

Unit run(){ await(network != null) ;

    messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA
    = Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),
    list [ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ,
           Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
           Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) )]) ;

    await( messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAQuery ) ;

    agentA = Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    textCryptoOfferIKESAA = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" )) ;

    nonceKEYAA = Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

    nonceANONCEA = Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

    textCryptoOfferIKESAB = TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ;

    newnonceKEYBB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

    newnonceBNONCEB = New(Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ) ;

    messageFromBToAtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceBNONCEB =
        Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
        list [ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ,
               Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
               Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )]) ;

    network!send( Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
    list [ TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" )) ,
           Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
           Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )]) ) ;

    messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB-
textCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentA-
hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = Message(AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ) ,
    list [
    Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
    Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
                Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ,
                TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
                Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
                                     Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) , list [ Agent(AgentVar( "A" )) ,
                                     Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ,
                                     TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) , Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,
                                     Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) , Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ,
                TextOrigin("CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ) ;

    await( messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAAQuery ) ;

    keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB =
    Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ) ,

```

```

Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ) ;

hashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB =
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ) ;

keyKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBB =
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ],
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ] ) ) ;

decryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyComposite-
nonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBencryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAA-
nonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA =
Decrypt( KeyComposite(list [
  Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ), list [
  Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
    Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
      Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
      Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ), list [ Agent( AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ] ) ] ) ;

hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYAAnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB =
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ;

textCryptoOfferCHILDSAA = TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ) ;

agentB = Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

newkeyKeyABPSK = New( Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ),
  AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ) ) ;

hashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEB =
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ;

textCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ;

encryptKeyCompositemhashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYAAnonceKEYBBagentBhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAB-
nonceKEYBBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB =
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
  Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
    Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
  Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ),
    AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ] ) ),
list [ Agent( AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ), AgentVar( "B" ), KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ),
  Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ),
    AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ) ;

```

```

messageFromBToAencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtext-
CryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKeyCompositenonceKEYYAAnonceKEYYBbagentBhashkeyKeyABPSK-
textCryptoOfferIKESABnonceKEYYBnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCE-
BtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAB = Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )] )] ) ), list [ Agent(AgentVar( "B" )),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )] ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ])) ;

network!send( Message(AgentVar( "B" ),AgentVar( "A" ),
list [
Encrypt( KeyComposite(list [
Hash( list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ),
AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Key( KeyComposite(list [ Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYA" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )] )] ) ), list [ Agent(AgentVar( "B" )),
Hash( list [ Key( KeySymmetricFresh( AgentVar( "A" ),AgentVar( "B" ),KeyCounterVar( "PSK" ) ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_IKE_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "KEYB" ), AgentVar( "B" ) ) ),
Nonce( NonceVar ( "ANONCE" ), AgentVar( "A" ) ), Nonce( NonceVar ( "BNONCE" ), AgentVar( "B" ) )] ) ),
TextOrigin( "CryptoOffer_CHILD_SA", AgentVar( "B" ) ) ] ])) ;

}
/* End of run-method */

Unit receive(ProtocolClause msg){
if ( testmessageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYYAAnonceANONCEA (msg) )
{messageFromAToBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYYAAnonceANONCEAQuery = True ;

}
else {
if ( testmessageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAA-
keyKeyCompositenonceKEYYAAnonceKEYYBbagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAA (msg) )
{messageFromAToBencryptKeyCompositehashnonceANONCEAnonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferIKESAAkeyKey-
CompositenonceKEYYAAnonceKEYYBbagentAhashkeyKeyABPSKtextCryptoOfferIKESAAnonceKEYYAAnonceANONCEA-
nonceBNONCEBtextCryptoOfferCHILDSAAQuery = True ;

}
else { skip ;

}
}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of test method */

}
/* End of receive method */

}
/* End of class */

// The protocol: IKE version 2 mac
{
Agent zombieAgent = new cog ZombieAgent(AgentName("TestZombie") ) ;

Network network ;

network = new cog Network(zombieAgent) ;

```

```
Agent objectA ;
objectA = new cog Aclass (AgentVar( "A" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "A" ), objectA) ;

Agent objectB ;
objectB = new cog Bclass (AgentVar( "B" ) , network) ;
network!register(AgentVar( "B" ), objectB) ;

}
// end of file
```